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Patents for Environmentalists
F. Scott Kieff
When organizers of the National Association of Environmental
Law Societies’ (NAELS) annual meeting asked me to help explore
the interface between patent policy and environmental policy, they
wisely recognized that I know relatively little about the
environmental side of this interface and consequently asked me to
approach matters from the patent side instead. Therefore, this essay
explains how patent law operates generally with an emphasis on how
it may impact the environment in particular. In so doing, the essay
addresses from a patent perspective some representative concerns
relating to patents that appear to be prevalent in the environmental
literature1 and shows how the patent system may provide substantial
benefit for those favoring the environment.
The environmental impact of the U.S. patent system can be best
understood by first exploring the patent system’s central goals and
effects, as well as its general context. The central goal of the U.S.
patent system is to provide an economic tool for promoting public
access to new technologies.2 While the central effect of the system
John M. Olin Senior Research Fellow in Law, Economics, and Business, Harvard Law
School, and Associate Professor, Washington University School of Law. I gratefully
acknowledge contributions from the officers of the National Association of Environmental Law
Societies Conference Planning Committee, the Washington University Environmental Law
Society, and the Washington University Journal of Law and Policy for framing the issues
addressed in this essay, as well as the particular insights provided by Christine Cochran, Alexis
Gorton, Ron Kaufmann, Stephen Nickelsburg, Troy Paredes, and Susan Vitale. I especially
appreciate the able research assistance, critical evaluation, and editing of Jessica E. Merrigan.
Comments are welcome and may be sent to fskieff.91@alum.mit.edu (permanent address). This
essay was prepared for the 2002 National Association of Environmental Law Societies’
(NAELS) Conference: “Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future” held at Washington
University School of Law in St. Louis on March 15-17, 2002.
1. I am indebted to the NAELS Conference organizers for identification of some
representative issues in the environmental literature. Although limited independent research
confirmed a similar set of issues, I am confident that a great many other issues exist at this
interface and that they will be aptly addressed in due course by others.
2. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
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has been the achievement of this goal,3 the impact of such increased
access is not an unmitigated good. For example, while some
technologies when put to some uses may help the environment,
others may hurt. This is where an understanding of context becomes
important, because the patent system does not operate in a legal
vacuum. The potential for harmful impact is well recognized and
addressed by diverse parts of the U.S. legal system that regulate and
in some cases prohibit the use of certain technologies, whether they
happen to be patented or unpatented. Consider, for example, the
extensive regulations administered by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) on the use of chemicals,4 those of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) on the use of drugs,5 and those under many
state laws on the use of firearms.6 To the extent that environmental
interests are in favor of such restrictions on use, the interests need not
be troubled by the patent system because the patent system gives the
patentee only an additional right to exclude use of whatever is
covered by the patent claim.7 Patents do not give patentees any right
to use. Therefore, the patent system has no effect on other restrictions
on use, whether the restrictions come from the environmental arena
or elsewhere.
In contradistinction, to the extent that environmental and other
interests are in favor of increased use, the patent system can provide
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) (showing how the patent system operates, by design,
as an economic tool for promoting commercialization of new technologies). See also DONALD
S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 58-90 (2d ed. 2001) (reviewing incentive to
commercialize and other incentive theories of the patent system).
3. Kieff, supra note 2, at 699-700 (collecting sources).
4. See generally Major Environmental Laws, available at http://www.epa.gov/
epahome/laws.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2002) (index of representative statutory foundations for
the work of the Food and Drug Administration, including active internet links).
5. See generally Compilation of Laws Enforced by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration and Related Statutes, available at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/laws/lawtoc.htm
(last visited Apr. 19, 2002) (index of representative statutory foundations for the work of the
Food and Drug Administration, including active internet links).
6. See generally Department of the Treasury Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
State Laws and Published Ordinances-Firearms 22nd Edition, available at http://www.atf.treas.
gov/firearms/statelaws/22edition.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2002) (index of representative state
laws regulating firearms, including active internet links).
7. U.S. patents give to the patentee only a right to exclude others from using whatever is
claimed in the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a) (1994) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to
the patentee . . . of the right to exclude others.”).
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great benefit. A central concern about patents that is expressed both
generally, and specifically in the environmental literature,8 is the fear
that the patent right to exclude use will cause patented technologies
to be underused. But the patent literature teaches that the right to
exclude use that is the core of the patent system’s enforcement rules
actually operates to increase use by facilitating ex ante investment in
the complex, costly, and risky commercialization activities required
to turn nascent inventions into new goods and services.9 This right to
exclude competitors who have not shared in bearing the initial costs
of commercialization provides incentives for the holder of the
invention and the other players in this market to come together in an
organized way and incur the costs necessary to facilitate
commercialization of the patented invention.10 The drafters of our
present patent system, the 1952 Patent Act, had precisely this concern
for commercialization in mind when drafting the statute and were
motivated by the specific fear that, for example, the handicapped in
need of a new wheelchair might not find one to buy if the patent
system did not provide an incentive for it to be brought to market in
the first instance.11
The patent system evolved a set of patentability rules such that the
system can generate this increase in use while at the same time
minimizing social costs, including those typically associated with
8. As discussed generally supra note 1, NAELS Conference meeting organizers
suggested that I treat the work of Gollin and Derzko as representative of the environmental
community’s views on this particular issue. See, e.g., Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual
Property to Improve Environmental Protection, 4 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 193 (1991) (exploring
the potential intellectual property protection has for promoting innovation in environmental
technology); Michael A. Gollin, Patent Law and the Environment/Technology Paradox, 20
Envtl. L. Rep. 10171 (1990) (discussing the need to expand environmental law from merely
controlling harmful technology to also encouraging beneficial technology and the model that
patent law could provide for this); see also, e.g., Natalie Derzko, Using Intellectual Property
Law and Regulatory Processes to Foster the Innovation and Diffusion of Environmental
Technologies, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 8 (1996) (exploring the problems for innovation in
the current environmental regulatory scheme).
9. Kieff, supra note 2, at 707-10 (explaining how the right to exclude use promotes
commercialization by facilitating the social ordering and bargaining around inventions that are
necessary to generate output in the form of information about the invention, a product of the
invention, or a useful embodiment of the invention).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 736-46 (showing how the drafters of the 1952 Patent Act were motivated by the
commercialization theory and specifically contemplated such a wheelchair example).
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information, administration, public choice, races for a common prize,
and bargaining.12 For example, patent law’s requirements regarding
the prior art, the § 10213 and § 10314 requirements that an invention
be novel and non-obvious, operate to protect investments, including
those by someone other than the patentee.15 In addition, the § 11216
disclosure requirements decrease social costs by giving clear notice
about the property right, which both decreases the chance of
inadvertent infringement and of duplicative efforts towards the same
invention.17
The complex interactions in the patent system between the rules
for enforcing and obtaining patents operate dynamically through the
crux of the patent, the claim, to ensure that patents have a scope that
is “just right.”18 As Judge Rich often said about patents, “the name of
the game is the claim . . . [and] the function of claims is to enable
everyone to know, without going through a lawsuit, what infringes
the patent and what does not.”19 According to Judge Rich, claims
present a fundamental dilemma for every patentee because “the
stronger a patent the weaker it is and the weaker a patent the stronger
it is.”20 By this dilemma, he meant that a broad patent claim is strong
12. F. Scott Kieff, In response to the Notice for Public Hearings and Opportunity for
Comment, Comments Regarding Competition & Intellectual Property, Summary of Proposed
Testimony, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/harvardlaw.
pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2002) (showing how positive patent law rules, particularly those for
obtaining patents, operate to minimize social costs).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (novelty and statutory bars).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) (nonobviousness).
15. Kieff, supra note 12, at 6. In this sense, the novelty requirement can be viewed as a
tool for ensuring that patents do not issue on anything others are already doing and the nonobviousness requirement can be viewed as a tool for ensuring that patents do not issue on
anything that others are about to do.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶¶ 1-2 (1994) (setting forth the disclosure requirements of patent law:
(1) written description; (2) enablement; (3) best mode; and (4) definiteness, which is also stated
as the requirement that the claims particularly point out and distinctly claim).
17. Kieff, supra note 12, at 6.
18. Id. at 9-10.
19. See, e.g., Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims—
American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499, 501 (1990)
(quoted in Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1539 (Plager, J.,
joined by Archer, J.; Rich, J; and Laurie, J., dissenting)) (emphasis in original).
20. See, e.g., Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 641, 644 (1967) (responding to proposed legislation S. 1042 and H.R. 5924,
90th Cong. (1967) and Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System (1966)).
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on offense because it covers more and therefore is more likely to be
infringed, but it also is weak on defense because it may cover
something in the prior art or fail to contain a sufficiently detailed
disclosure, and therefore is more likely to be invalid; while a narrow
claim is weak on offense, because it covers less and therefore is less
likely to be infringed, but it also is strong on defense because it is less
likely to cover something in the prior art or fail to contain a
sufficiently detailed disclosure, and therefore also is less likely to be
invalid.21
Patents vetted through such a self-disciplining regime can form
the basis of licensing transactions with others seeking permission
from the patentee to practice whatever is claimed in the patent. These
transactions allow those seeking use to obtain permission for use. For
example, a patented technology that has beneficial environmental
impact can be licensed to all those who wish to achieve that impact.
Importantly, the patent system has developed a set of rules about
licensing that operate ex post to maximize the likelihood that all those
wanting such use will get it. Putative licensees who place a high
value on such use and those who place a low value on such use are
both attractive targets to a patentee as long as the patentee is allowed
to set a different price for different users. This practice is called price
discrimination. Patent law allows patentees to price discriminate
among such licensees because this gives patentees a strong financial
incentive to ensure all those desiring use get use; even a monopolist
who can price discriminate will push output to the full competitive
output level.22 Such beneficial price discrimination can take place
because patent law, and contract law, allow for the enforcement of
the restrictive licenses needed to prevent arbitrage between low value
and high value users.23 In the presence of such a system, a patentee is
21. Id. (explaining patentee’s dilemma, or in his words, “puzzle”).
22. Kieff, supra note 2, at 727-32 (showing how the patent system’s facilitation of tie-ins
and other forms of price discrimination where technological and economic factors alone might
prevent price discrimination together provide incentives for the patentee to elect to keep output
at competitive levels).
23. Id. The prevention of arbitrage is essential for price discrimination to work. For
example, those obtaining senior citizen discounts could sell their low price tickets to patrons
who would otherwise have to pay full price if movie theatres did not require some proof of age
on admission, which may be as simple as looking at the ticket holder.
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rationally motivated to avoid posting an excessive price because to do
so would scare away would-be paying customers and this result
would be a money-losing venture.
Even where the user is not able to pay any positive price, the
patentee may be rationally motivated to grant a license for free. The
granting of a free license may provide the patentee with an
inexpensive way to preserve the legal force of the patent property
right for use in other transactions with paying customers.24 The
patentee may also be able to derive advertising benefits from such
uses as long as they are successful uses and their low price does not
cause customer-relations harm with the high-paying customer base.25
Thus, even very low value users are likely to be able to obtain
licenses from the patentee.
Some argue that while patentees may be rationally motivated to
sell permission to each user, and users may be rationally motivated to
buy permission from patentees, such sales may not be consummated
because of various market failures.26 In response to these concerns,
24. F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science—A Response to Rai & Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691, 705 (2001)
(discussing a property owner’s rational decision to allow free users so as to avoid the cost of
monitoring low value uses while preserving the full scope of the property right for other high
value uses).
25. Giving away product to the poor will force the patentee to wrestle with a delicate
customer-relations balance. On the one hand, paying customers may be offended to learn of the
availability of a price that is lower, or even zero. On the other hand, paying customers may be
motivated to buy when they learn of both the patented technology’s success and the patentee’s
seemingly charitable contributions. Although it may seem crass to call such a contribution
“charitable,” since its purpose is the facilitation of some other objective (charging a higher price
to some customers), presumably every donation willingly made to a charitable cause by a
rational actor is done to further some objective of that actor and not to further only someone
else’s objective. While the net impact of these competing forces is uncertain, the patentee’s
desires to preserve value while avoiding transaction costs that are discussed infra note 24 will
likely tip the net balance of incentives to be towards the use of such free licenses in certain
cases.
26. This argument and its implications are explored in depth in the important works by
Eisenberg et al. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (arguing that
patents can deter innovation in the field of basic biological research); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Property Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987)
(exploring potential negative impact of patent rights on scientific norms in the field of basic
biological research); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) (exploring an experimental use
exemption from patent infringement as a device for alleviating potential negative impact of
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some commentators argue that patents should be protected by a
liability rule27 instead of a property rule.28
Indeed, there are already important liability rule provisions in
patent law today. Otherwise infringing uses that are by or for the
federal government enjoy sovereign immunity protection that
effectively results in a compulsory licensing regime.29 In addition, the
high costs of litigation under the present rules of civil procedure and
the ability for an infringer to be kept effectively judgment proof
through corporate and bankruptcy laws may also operate as a form of
liability rule gloss on the present property rule regime.30
Not only is the market power of the patent not as strong as it may
seem,31 it may have the beneficial effect of inducing even more new
technologies. To the extent that some would-be licensees may not be
able to obtain permission for use despite manifesting some
patent rights on scientific norms in the field of basic biological research); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Public Research and Private Development: Patents & Technology Transfer in GovernmentSponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996) (offering preliminary observations about the
empirical record of the use of patents in the field of basic biological research and
recommending a retreat from present government policies of promoting patents in that field).
27. An entitlement enjoys the protection of a property rule if the law condones its
surrender only through voluntary exchange. The holder of such an entitlement is allowed to
enjoin infringement. An entitlement has the lesser protection of a liability rule if it can be lost
lawfully to anyone willing to pay some court-determined compensation. The holder of such an
entitlement is only entitled to damages caused by infringement. See Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); see also Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus,
Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335 (1986).
28. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without
Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive
Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999) (criticizing recent increases in certainty in patent law
and suggesting the use of liability rules instead of property rules for patent enforcement).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994) (providing limited waiver of sovereign immunity for acts of
infringement by or for the federal government and instead allowing suits against the
government in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for a reasonable royalty).
30. As explained more fully in Kieff, supra note 2:
Concerning procedure, litigation costs may be high enough to prevent the patentee
from seeking court intervention against an infringer. Concerning substance, the
limitations on liability that are available to a would-be infringer through the use of the
corporate form or bankruptcy laws, for example, may encourage acts of infringements
that are essentially judgment proof.
Id. at 734 n.154.
31. In addition to the infringement threats discussed supra in the text accompanying notes
29-30, the patentee faces market threats from old technologies, alternative non-infringing
technologies, and future technologies. See Kieff, supra note 2, at 729-31 (collecting sources).
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willingness to pay some positive price,32 the presence of such
potential customers and the potential for an independent patent each
provide incentives for others to bring to market some alternative noninfringing substitute.33
Moreover, the political process provides several solutions for
would-be licensees. They may prevail on the government simply to
provide such use in particular cases.34 They may alternatively prevail
on the government to subsidize their ability to pay.35
Ensuring an environmental use through a switch in the patent
system towards over-all liability rule treatment should be avoided
because these other remedies are available and because such a shift
will frustrate the important goals of the patent system, including
those that are specifically pro-environment, such as the
commercialization of beneficial technologies. The use of liability
rules would lead to a net increase in social cost and frustrate the very
efforts for ordering and bargaining around patents that are necessary
to generate output of patented inventions in the first instance, thereby
decreasing over-all social access to new technologies.36 As
recognized by Merges, it is precisely because private parties have a
comparative advantage over courts in valuing patents and patented
inventions that a property rule is likely to work better than a liability
32. See id. at 731 (discussing possibility that some licensees may not be able to obtain
permission to use the patented invention).
33. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 75-76 (discussing incentive to design around
patented inventions).
34. See supra text accompanying note 29. The recent public demand for the patented drug
Cipro® to treat anthrax infection provides an example from the healthcare arena of just such
behavior. See, e.g., Terence Chea, Vaccines Are Hot Topic, But Not Hot Investment, WASH.
POST, Dec. 13, 2001, at E1. “At the height of the anthrax crisis, government officials considered
overriding German drugmaker Bayer AG's Cipro patent to purchase pills at a better price.
Under threat of losing its patent, Bayer agreed to sell the government the antibiotic at half
price.” Id.
35. See Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize
the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 124-25 (1997)
(arguing that the government offer a cash subsidy to any consumer who values a patented good
above marginal cost but is unwilling or unable to pay to such a price). Cf. Kieff, supra note 2, at
716 n.91 (noting that such proposals face the distortion and implementation concerns generally
raised against subsidies).
36. Kieff, supra note 2, at 732-36 (showing how the potential infringements induced by a
liability rule will discourage investment in the commercialization process ex ante and may even
result in a net destruction of social wealth if the collective costs of entry and exit across
infringers exceeds the social surplus otherwise created by the invention).
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rule according to the established test for choosing between the two
types of regimes.37
The ability to exclude use through a patent not only facilitates
increased use, it also provides individual actors with a legal
alternative to self-help approaches that may have more pernicious
impact on the ability to obtain use.38 Consider, for example, the
concern expressed in the environmental literature about a form of
self-help in the agricultural sector called “terminator technologies”
and the fear that these might cause environmentally important plant
species to die out.39 Terminator technology refers to seeds that were
genetically altered so as to yield crops whose resulting seed will be
sterile.40 The technology prevents farmers from harvesting seeds from
crops they have grown using genetically engineered seeds, thereby
forcing farmers to buy more of the original seed each planting
season.41 Terminator technology can also be thought of as the
agricultural equivalent of copy protection technology in the software
industry.
Such terminator and copy protection technologies are each a form
of self-help that can be used as an alternative to legal protection in a
way that is likely to be more costly than legal protection. Consider a
market for some modified form of seed that was altered so as to make
it especially valuable compared to other seeds. Since seeds generate
plants that in turn produce more seeds, the sale of a seed must take
into account the potential of vast progeny seeds that are themselves
37. Id. at 734 n.152. (citing Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual
Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2664 (1994)).
38. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486-87 (1974) (Burger,
C.J.) (highlighting, in the context of a discussion about the benefits of allowing even the lesser
form of protection provided by trade secret laws, social costs of the self-help measures that
would be used by individual actors if legal forms of protection were not available).
39. As discussed generally supra note 1, on this particular issue, NAELS Conference
organizers suggested that I treat as representative of the environmental community’s views the
work of Ozcek and Evans. See, e.g., Jeremy P. Ozcek, Note, In the Aftermath of the
“Terminator” Technology Controversy: Intellectual Property Protections for Genetically
Engineered Seeds and the Right to Save and Replant Seed, 41 B.C. L. REV. 627 (2000)
(exploring the problems associated with so-called “terminator technologies”); Laura E. Ewens,
Note, Seed Wars: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, and the Quest for High Yield Seeds, 23
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 307 (2000) (same).
40. One example of such terminator technology is the Technology Protection System™
from Monsanto. Ozcek, supra note 39, at 628.
41. Id. at 629; Ewens, supra note 39, at 306-07.
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potent for germination. The seller must consider the risk that the
buyer will generate maximal progeny, maybe even returning to the
market to sell some progeny seeds in competition with the original
seller. The price needed to cover for this risk will far exceed the price
needed to cover a sale to a farmer who will only use the seed for
production of a single crop and who will not generate progeny seed.
Buyers seeking seed for the purpose of growing such a single crop
will want to identify themselves convincingly to sellers. Sellers’
willingness to sell to such buyers at the lower price will decrease to
the extent the seller disbelieves that the buyer indeed intends to and
will use the seed for a single crop. As a result, both pricing and
consummation of that sale are frustrated. In contradistinction,
terminator technology ensures that both sides of the sale will keep to
its terms. Because both seller and buyer know the seed will only be of
value for a single crop, pricing and consummation of that sale are
facilitated.
But technological self-help is not needed if a legal device will
have the same effect, especially if the legal device will be cheaper.
One legal device may be a contract for sale having a restrictive term,
such as a clause agreeing that the seed will only be used for a single
crop. A problem with such a contract may be that it will have
enforcement problems. The ordinary contract remedy of expectation
damages is likely to under deter breach.42 In addition, contract
remedies will have difficulty reaching any third-party transferees of
progeny seeds. Patent law offers a convenient aid because patents can
be licensed with restrictive terms and patent remedies include the
right to an injunction against any infringer, including both third
parties and those in contract privity with the patentee.43 For this
reason, courts uphold patent licenses that restrict buyers to a single
use.44 Indeed, restrictive patent licenses have the added advantage of
42. See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference With Contract Versus “Efficient”
Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1999) (arguing that so-called
efficient breaches of contracts are often not efficient when viewed from the dynamic
perspective).
43. See, e.g., CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 1223-1308 (discussing patent remedies
including the right to an injunction and, where infringement is willful, to attorney fees and
treble damages).
44. See, e.g., Mallinkcrodt v. Medipart, 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding single-use
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avoiding the potential risk of some harmful biological consequences
that are feared to be associated with self-help devices like the
terminator technology, such as the potential for its accidental spread
to other plants for which germination is otherwise desired.45
Therefore, patents, especially when used with enforceable restrictive
patent licenses, may be important tools for avoiding environmental
concerns with terminator technologies.
Finally, the patent system can also offer some help to those
environmentalists who are concerned about the need to ensure
resources for custodians of biodiversity.46 While developing nations
are often the custodians of biodiversity, they are often excluded from
sharing in the benefits of the patents that derive from such
biodiversity.47 But the enforcement of property rights should lead to
an arrangement in which those benefits are shared with the
custodians.48 For example, intellectual property rights in the United
States have been long recognized to be a critical factor in creating
restriction on patented catheter enforceable).
45. One feared mechanism by which such pernicious spreading of terminator technologies
might take place is discussed in Kojo Yelpaala, Owning The Secret Of Life: Biotechnology And
Property Rights Revisited, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 111 (2000).
Terminator Seed technology has the potential for serious environmental damage.
Through cross-pollination, the Terminator Seed technology could spread from farm to
farm and into other varieties of seeds. Given that the Terminator Seed technology can
be combined with ordinary non-patented seeds and with other genetically engineered
technologies such as the herbicide-resistant plant technology, the spread of the
Terminator Seed technology would be virtually unstoppable. Imagine the thousands of
different varieties of maize in Mexico being exposed to the Terminator Seed
technology from a few farms. With time the technology could threaten the biodiversity of seeds in Mexico.
Id. at 209.
46. As discussed generally supra note 1, on this particular issue, NAELS Conference
organizers suggested that I treat as representative of the environmental community’s views the
work of my colleague, McManis. See, e.g., Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between
International Intellectual Property and Environmental Protection: Biodiversity and
Biotechnology, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 255 (1998) (exploring the influence of patent law on
biodiversity).
47. See McManis, supra note 46, at 268-70 (arguing that Article 16 of the Biodiversity
Treaty attempts to ensure that profits are shared with indigenous populations who are
custodians of such biodiversity); see also Ewans, supra note 39, at 289 (commenting on the
failure to share such patent profits with indigenous populations).
48. Gollin, supra note 8, at 216 (noting that grants of proprietary rights may permit such a
system of sharing to develop through private agreements and international initiatives).

318

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 9:307

national wealth,49 and this pool of financial wealth is available in at
least several senses for use in helping the biodiversity custodians.
Those having the pool of financial wealth may elect to share it
through general international subsidies. They may also be encouraged
to exchange some of that financial wealth for some continued access
to the pool of biodiversity wealth. To the extent that those granting
access to the biodiversity wealth have not had a fair shot when
forging such deals, efforts to ensure legal representation during
contract negotiations between indigenous cultures and bioprospectors might provide one solution.50 But it is important to
realize that regardless of which method is used to allocate the wealth
created by the patent system, a robust protection for patents must be
maintained or the wealth itself will be sacrificed.
In conclusion, the patent system may be good for
environmentalists because it increases public access to new
technologies, decreases use of environmentally dangerous self-help
approaches, and increases the wealth available for all purposes,
including helping the custodians of biodiversity. To the extent new
technologies are helpful to environmental goals, such as cleaner
burning engines, the patent system can be seen as generating
environmental good by providing incentives for their
commercialization ex ante. To the extent new technologies are
harmful to environmental goals, such as poisonous chemicals, the
patent system can be seen as at least not causing environmental
damage because the patent right to exclude use would not interfere
with a regulatory system’s own effort to exclude use. To the extent
environmentalists are concerned about ex post ability to gain access
49. See Kieff, supra note 2, at 699 n.4 (“Economic research over the past sixty years has
amply established a causal link between the development of intellectual property and the
growth of our national economy, while also showing that intellectual property is an increasingly
critical component of United States capital and foreign trade.”).
50. Indeed, McManis and others devoted substantial personal effort towards this end, and
we are indebted for the example they provide. Moreover, even where express individualized
contracting cannot be achieved, an international treaty could be created to essentially impose a
tax on gains from patents generated though access to such cultures and then transfer the
proceeds from such a tax to the custodians. But each of these solutions raises yet other serious
problems. For example, it may be quite difficult to identify who “merits” treatment as
“custodian” of biodiversity. The national government, a local government, a tribal unit, a family
unit, a political leader, a military leader, a spiritual leader, or some host of other individuals and
organizations might each lay claim to that status or interfere with the claims by the others.
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to technologies covered by a patent right to exclude use, the patent
system’s rules about licensing and price discrimination encourage
patentees to seek out and license as many users as possible, even low
value users. Moreover, to the extent environmentalists are concerned
about dangerous self-help approaches, such as the terminator
technologies that might be used by sellers of agricultural products,
the patent system provides these sellers with a more attractive option
that also poses less potential danger for the environment. Finally, to
the extent environmentalists are concerned about helping custodians
of biodiversity, the patent system creates economic wealth from such
biodiversity that is then available for allocation among its custodians
and users according to ordinary market and political mechanisms.
Therefore, those who care about the environment ought to care about
patents precisely because the present patent system may be so
beneficial for the environment.

